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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The true faith of an Armorer…[is] to give arms to all men who offer an honest price for them, 
without respect of persons or principles…to all sorts and conditions, all nationalities, all faiths, 
all follies, all causes and all crimes.  You will do what pays us.  You will make war when it suits 
us, and keep peace when it doesn’t.  You will find out that trade requires certain measures when 
we have decided on those measures.  When I want anything to keep my dividends up, you will 
discover that my want is a national need.  When other people want something to keep my 
dividends down, you will call out the police and military.  And in return you shall have the support 
and applause of my newspapers, and the delight of imagining that you are a great statesman.1 
-Andrew Underschaft, the armaments manufacturer 
in George Bernard Shaw’s Major Barbara 
 
In the mid-1990s, an arms deal was reached between the United Kingdom and Saudi 
Arabia that included the sale of cruise missiles manufactured by the British firm Marconi, 
a forerunner to BAE Systems, today one of largest arms-producing companies in the 
world.  Twenty years later, in September 2015, the remnants of a cruise missile with 
Marconi labeling was found in the demolished remains of a Yemeni ceramics factory, the 
site of an airstrike that killed one civilian.2  The airstrike, conducted by a Saudi Arabian-
led coalition, was one of many in the current conflict in Yemen, a war in which airstrikes 
have not only caused the majority of the 2,600 civilian casualties, but also done enormous 
harm to the country’s fragile infrastructure and economic development, with schools, 
hospitals, ports, and markets frequently serving as targets for the indiscriminant strikes.3 
Western arms companies like BAE Systems are largely responsible for providing 
Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies with the means to prosecute the war.  Despite the 																																																								
1 Shaw (1917), 127-128, 143 
2 Amnesty International (2015) 
3 Bowcott (2015) 
	 2	
country’s long record of human rights abuses and a recent “landmark” Arms Trade 
Treaty (ATT) in 2014, which prohibits countries from exporting arms that could “be used 
in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity…attacks against civilian objects 
or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes,” arms deals with Saudi Arabia 
continued unabated in 2015.4  Indeed, since the onset of the conflict in Yemen that 
March, the UK has issued more than 100 export licenses to Saudi Arabia; those from 
January to June in 2015 alone were worth an estimated £1.75 billion.5  Moreover, the 
United Kingdom is certainly not the sole supplier.  In November of last year, the US State 
Department approved a $1.29 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia, including as many as 
13,000 smart bombs for use in Yemen.6 
These deals are just a few of many that comprise the global arms trade, a multi-
billion dollar business inextricably linked to economics, foreign policy, and human rights.  
Valued at $58 billion in 2012, the trade is both big and small.7  Small, when compared to 
the size of the trade in some other goods—fuels, for instance, were valued at $3.4 trillion 
in 2012.  Furthermore, when arms transfers are compared with the total value of global 
trade, they claim less than half a percentage point.8  Nevertheless, these figures belie the 
enormous influence that arms transfers have on states and human wellbeing: in 1994, for 
example, shortly after the modern heyday of the arms trade, the Cold War, it was 
estimated that “a fifth of all developing-world debt was due to arms purchasing.”9  Other 
studies have found that “the arms trade contributes roughly 40 per cent to all corruption 
																																																								
4 UNODO (2016) 
5 Bowcott (2015) 
6 Amos (2015) 
7 Bromley and Béraud-Sudreau (2014), 283 
8 WTO Statistics Database, accessed 3 December 2015 
9 Oxfam (2008), 10 
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in global transactions.”10  Clearly, arms transfers are part of an industry punching well 
above its weight class. 
This thesis attempts to put arms transfers and the modern defense industry in 
historical context by identifying the drivers of change in the trade and production of arms 
over time.  To this end, a review of the literature on the arms trade up to the Second 
World War comprises the first part of the study, presenting a largely qualitative overview 
of shifts in the flow of arms, the location of the world’s arms-producing centers, and 
changes in attitudes towards transfers as they have affected the trade, using data when 
available.  The second half of the study provides a data-driven analysis of trends in the 
international arms trade since 1950, the earliest year in which data was collected 
consistently.  As in the previous half, its focus is on developments in the supply and 
recipient side of the market, in addition to the events that have impacted arms production.  
The final section of the thesis concludes by providing the policy implications of the 
findings. 
As a final note before moving forward, it must be stated explicitly that this 
paper’s focus is on major conventional weapons—artillery, tanks, aircraft, and ships, for 
instance—and not on small arms or nuclear weapons.11   For variety, “arms,” “defense 
equipment,” and “weapons” are used interchangeably to refer to these major conventional 
weapons, with the exception of some portions of the pre-World War II history section.  
																																																								
10 Feinstein, Holden, and Pace (2011), 14; This is based on estimates originally presented by Joe Roeber for 
Transparency International in 2003.  For an excellent overview of corruption in the arms trade, see his 
article: Roeber, J. (2005, August 28). Hard-Wired for Corruption. Prospect Magazine. 
11 For the complete list of the arms considered major conventional weapons in this paper, please refer to 
SIRPI’s Arms Transfers Database coverage page: 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background/coverage/ 
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II.  A HISTORY OF THE ARMS TRADE 
 
The social sciences, by taste, by deep-seated instinct, perhaps by training, have a constant 
tendency to evade historical explanation.  It is up to historians, so say economists, to go back 
further than 1945, in search of old economies.  Economists thus voluntarily rob themselves of a 
marvelous field of observation, although without denying its value.12 
-Fernand Braudel, On History 
 
Buying and selling weapons is not a modern phenomenon.  Whether arrowheads, 
firearms, or modern aircraft, the exchange of arms is as old as humanity’s propensity for 
conflict.13  Indeed, in Andrew Feinstein’s exposé of the arms trade, The Shadow World, 
which chronicles the increasingly sordid arms deals of the past hundred years, the author 
refers to the work of the politicians, government officials, and individual arms dealers 
complicit in the trade as part of “the second-oldest profession.”14  Although the record of 
arms transfers goes back at least to Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War in the 
fifth century BCE, this chapter seeks primarily to outline the more recent economic 
history of the trade.15  Thus, after a brief overview of arms transfers in pre-modern times, 
the chapter will continue with an examination of the early modern period and subsequent 
centuries.  It is during these eras that many features present in the today’s arms industry 
first manifested themselves.  The patterns and developments in the arms trade then and in 
the centuries thereafter can provide a framework for an analysis of the industry today. 
 
																																																								
12 Braudel (1980), 35 
13 O’Connell (1989), 23 
14 Feinstein (2011), 1 
15 Krause (1992), 34 
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THE EARLY ARMS TRADE	
Prior to the mid-fifteenth century, the production of arms was largely the province of the 
state, with governments tending to enact policies restricting the export of arms.  During 
the Roman era, for instance, the state controlled the production and distribution of 
materiel within the empire, and by and large trade between Rome and the populations 
outside the empire did not exist.16  A variety of rulers and authority figures in later 
periods enacted similar export restrictions, acknowledging the danger inherent in 
supplying potential enemies with arms.  From 768-814, high-quality Frankish armor was 
prohibited from being sold outside of Charlemagne’s territory.  In 971, the Doge of 
Venice, presiding at the time over what was arguably Europe’s trading capital, banned 
the sale of arms to Saracens who were at war with Venice’s Balkan neighbors.  The 
Catholic Church, due to its involvement in the Crusades, also played a role in arms 
control by further prohibiting the sale of arms to Saracens in 1179 and at various other 
times in the thirteenth century.17 
The reasoning for such restrictions were, as they are today, likely both political 
and strategic; clearly, there is some amount of risk involved in supplying a foreign power 
with the means to prosecute a war.  In pre-modern times, prior to the advent of 
gunpowder in the fourteenth century and the frequent technological advances of 
subsequent centuries, which will be discussed in detail below, military innovation was 
very slow.  Consequently, unlike today, countries couldn’t rely on improvements in 
military technology to offset the strategic loss of exporting arms to foreign states.  Selling 
a hundred suits of armor or two hundred spears abroad were three hundred pieces of 
military equipment that directly reduced the relative strength of the exporting state, and 																																																								
16 Krause (1992), 35 
17 Ibid. 
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which wouldn’t become obsolete with the advent of a “newer” spear.  In the words of one 
scholar on the arms trade, the “technology, materials, and skills necessary to build ships 
and arm men were relatively evenly distributed and widely known” such that “arms 
exports diminished one’s potential arsenal and augmented that of likely (or actual) 
enemies.”18  Clearly, significant export bans and limited trade in arms is no longer the 
case today.  As we will see below, the arms trade began to take its contemporary form in 
the early modern period, as the forces of globalization and technological advances in 
weaponry due to the military revolution changed the industry. 
 
THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD	
“Early modern times were indeed the infancy of the arms industry,” write Helmuth 
Engelbrecht and Frank Hanighen in their study of the international arms trade.19  During 
this era—indeed, to this day—Europe dominated the industry.  Endowed with an 
impressive trade network from the heyday of mercantile giants Venice and Genoa, Italy, 
for some time up until the early to mid-fifteenth century, was “the most notable centre of 
arms production and transfers in the world.”20  Genoa, for instance, was a key crossbow 
manufacturer, while Milan enjoyed a position as one of the largest producers of armor.21  
Italy held this lead “as long as the race lay between ever more efficient crossbows and 
more and more elaborate plate armor,” but the primacy of its armaments industry 
eventually fell to inferiority with the advent of firearms.22 
																																																								
18 Krause (1992), 34, 35 
19 Engelbrecht and Hanighen (1934), 16 
20 Stohl and Grillot (2009), 11 
21 McNeill (1982), 80 
22 Ibid. 
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The combination of military innovation, industrial developments, and strategic 
considerations drove production and trade centers to England and the Low Countries 
decisively by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.  The city of Liége in 
Belgium, for example, would come to be “one of the largest and best-known arms centers 
in Europe,” retaining its importance well into the eighteenth century.23  The dominance of 
England and the Low Countries over other producers at the time and the ubiquity of arms 
in society was to such a degree that “virtually all European states and principalities 
purchased weapons from [these] two first-tier producers at some point in the period from 
1450-1650.”24 
Notably, the English experience with the arms industry at this time in history is 
indicative of a broader and recurrent feature of the arms trade, namely, the importance of 
exports.  As will be seen frequently throughout this thesis, access to foreign markets is 
often considered a sine qua non for a thriving domestic arms industry in the long run.  
Without the stable revenue from exports, arms manufacturers tend to struggle covering 
the high production and R&D costs associated with arms production, typically resulting 
in less competitive products, to the disadvantage of the home country of that company.  
The English example can help clarify this point.  English cannons in the 1600s, for 
instance, were the envy of Europe, imported by Denmark, Holland, France, Flanders, 
Spain, and even India and Japan.25  However, despite the testimony of English arms 
manufacturer John Browne in 1613 delineating the importance of foreign customers for 
																																																								
23 Thayer (1969), 22 
24 Krause (1992), 44; Because Italy’s arms industry was already on the decline at this point, the “two first-
tier producers” Krause is referring to are England and the Low Countries (Liége, more specifically).  
Germany’s relevance as a producer at this time is ambiguous, but due to “the great arsenal in 
Suhl…Germany should perhaps be considered…a first-tier producer.” 
25 Ibid. 41, 43 
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his business, the unpalatable notion of supplying arms to potential adversaries coupled 
with the prevailing economic ideology of mercantilism led to the establishment of various 
English laws restricting the export of arms.26  As Keith Krause writes, the net effect was 
to erode English dominance in the arms industry such that “by the late seventeenth 
century, England again depended almost entirely on imports of European arms,” with 
Sweden taking up the mantle as the foremost supplier of cannons thereafter until the late 
eighteenth century.27 
 Other sovereign states, recognizing the national security risk posed by relying on 
foreign powers for arms, sought to establish their own defense industries, though with 
lesser success than their ‘first-tier’ competitors mentioned above.  Russia, France, Spain, 
and the Ottoman Empire, for example, all encouraged the migration of skilled workers 
through state policies in the early modern period in an effort to develop their arms 
industries.28  Unfortunately, despite the technological diffusion resulting from the new 
workforce, they all lacked some of the factors of production necessary for a robust and 
innovative industry, ranging from underdeveloped commercial infrastructure in the case 
of France to insufficient industrial production capacity and low levels of general 
economic activity in the case of Russia.29 
 Additionally, although arms production and military innovation was primarily a 
European affair during this era, the trade of weapons was not confined to the continent.  
Indeed, the early modern period also coincides with the increase in European trade 
associated with the Age of Discovery and the onset of globalization.  England, for 
																																																								
26 Krause (1992), 41 
27 Ibid. 42 
28 Ibid. 44 
29 Ibid. 46-47 
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instance, sent cannons to India and Japan in the 1600s, while Portugal, despite being a net 
importer of arms and only a marginal producer, utilized its large trade network to ship 
modern weaponry to Africa and Asia.30  Ultimately, the proliferation of European 
armaments and the resultant technological diffusion throughout the world allowed states 
such as Turkey, India, China, and Japan to imitate these weapons, achieving some 
success as arms producers.31 
 Lastly, also fueling the trade and production of arms during this era was a level of 
technological advancement in weaponry previously unseen in history.  The period of 
1560-1660, in particular, has been referred to by historians as ‘the military revolution’, 
owing to the unprecedented changes in the landscape of warfare at the time, including the 
remodeling of battlefield tactics to accommodate the introduction of modern military 
equipment—gunpowder, firearms, and cannons.32  These new armaments accelerated a 
shift that had already begun well before the 1500s with the advent of the crossbow, a 
weapon with “socially revolutionary implications” due to the ease with which unskilled 
lower-class soldiers could pierce the armor of upper-class knights.33  In the case of 
firearms, however, the implications were even more severe, as armies equipped with 
older weapons could no longer rival with those armed with guns.  Consequently, states 
scrambled to acquire the armaments:  
 
																																																								
30 Stohl and Grillot (2009), 13 
31 Ibid. 
32 For the seminal work on the topic, see Roberts, M. (1956). The Military Revolution, 1560-1660: An 
Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the Queen's University of Belfast. London: M. Boyd.  See also Parker, 
G. (1988). The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
33 Croft (1996), 24 
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The gap that emerged in the fifteenth century between states that had perfected the use of 
gunpowder and linked new scientific discoveries to warfare and those that had not 
generated a growing, sometimes desperate demand to catch up so as not to be outgunned 
by enemies.34 
 
Thus, so long as there were still states that had not yet acquired gunpowder-based 
armaments, the arms industry thrived and the trade of weapons remained frenetic.  The 
process of technological diffusion continued throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, after which the volume of arms transfers slowed down again such that “for 
nearly 200 years [from 1650-1850] following the military revolution…the arms trade was 
relatively stable.”35  Crucially, this is not to say that the exchange of weapons ceased 
during this period; obviously arms continued to be transferred, but the combination of 
slow growth in military technology and stringent state controls on the production and 
export of arms during this period contributed to a situation in which, although the 
“weapons themselves continued to spread…no new centres of production arose, and the 
structure of the system that had manifested itself by the late 1600s was not fundamentally 
altered” until the mid to late 1800s.36  Thus, it would not be until the technological 
improvements of the industrial revolution and the shifts in economic ideology of the time 
that the next great leap in the evolution of the arms industry would occur. 
 
 
 																																																								
34 Pearson (1994), 11 
35 Stohl and Grillot (2009), 13 
36 Krause (1992), 54 
	 11	
THE “MERCHANTS OF DEATH” ERA 
Already by the late eighteenth century, mercantilism’s appeal in Europe was beginning to 
wane.  The seminal writings of Adam Smith and other early economists of the time 
encouraged the rise of laissez-faire economics, a doctrine that greatly bolstered the global 
arms industry as both political and moral barriers to the trade of weapons fell in favor of 
economic gain.  The arms industry happily obliged this emerging environment of 
deregulation and limited government interference in private business; by the late 
nineteenth century, the stringent export controls of the past had relaxed and a freer 
market had taken root, leading arms manufacturers to eagerly pursue sales abroad.37  
Consequently, just as this period saw the rise of industrialist giants like Rockefeller, 
Carnegie, and J.P. Morgan, the weapons industry produced its own armament barons—
the likes of William Armstrong, Eugène Schneider, Alfred Krupp, and Edward Vickers, 
among others, with the latter three distinguished by one historian as the “best-known 
arms manufacturers of the steam age.”38  Thus, during this period, the evolution of the 
production and trade of arms is best told through the experiences of private 
manufacturers. 
William Armstrong’s gradual entrance into the arms industry is an instructive 
starting point.  First, despite advances in metallurgy and steam power during the 
industrial revolution, military technology in the mid-nineteenth century had in many 
ways not kept up with the times.  In as late as 1854, for instance, during the Crimean 
War, “the British still relied largely on smooth-bore muskets only marginally different 
from those which had served them well since the last decade of the seventeenth 
																																																								
37 Harkavy (1975), 34-35 
38 Collier (1980), 2 
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century.”39  After reading about the remarkably unwieldy cannons used by the English 
during the Battle of Inkerman, Armstrong, a respected engineer who had previously been 
contracted by his government to design underwater mines for the war, sought to develop 
an improved cannon. 40   The British government’s decision in 1859 to purchase 
Armstrong’s new gun instead of relying solely on state arsenals, as they had in the recent 
past, had a significant impact on the arms industry by revitalizing the private sector’s 
interest in the manufacture and sale of arms.41 
Already in 1862, however, partly in response to “cries from other manufacturers 
for open competition,” the British government terminated its contract with the Elswick 
Ordinance Company, the armaments offshoot of Armstrong’s engineering firm, and 
returned to procuring its artillery exclusively from the government’s arsenal at 
Woolrich.42  The company, having lost its sole customer in England, was devastated, and 
Armstrong resolved to sell his factory back to the government.  Although government 
officials declined the offer, the British government did subsidize its domestic arms 
industry in much the same way arms-producing states do today: it compensated Elswick 
for the cancelled orders (to the tune of £65,000) and allowed the company to keep the 
plant.43 
Still lacking a domestic consumer of armaments and stuck with a factory capable 
of producing fifty tons of guns per week, the Elswick Ordnance Company found itself in 
a position that all the other leading arms manufacturers of the late nineteenth century 
would find themselves in at some point.  Unsurprisingly, like the others, Armstrong opted 																																																								
39 Collier (1980), 34 
40 McNeill (1982), 239; Collier (1980), 36, 40 
41 Krause (1992), 58 
42 McNeill (1982), 239-240; Collier (1980), 47; Krause (1992), 58 
43 Collier (1980), 49 
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to enter the international market in order to remain in business.  In an era distinguished 
by a previously unheard of free market ideology, the decision proved propitious; by the 
late 1860s, Armstrong was selling his guns all over the world—to Egypt, Turkey, Italy, 
Chile, Austria, Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands, Peru, and both sides of the American 
Civil War, in addition to receiving an occasional smaller order on the side from the 
British government.44  Not only did the company cultivate a global customer base, by the 
eve of the First World War, it had also expanded the array of armaments it produced and 
exported to include engines for warships, naval cannons, amour plating, and aircraft. 
Notably, Armstrong’s experience meandering into the arms industry, as well as 
his dealings with the government, was typical of the leading manufacturers of the 
industrial era.  For several centuries after the military revolution, governments relied 
heavily on state arsenals for their military procurement and, although unintentional, also 
often avoided fostering any nascent private enterprise in arms production because of their 
protectionist policies.  In an era of free markets and frequent technological advances, 
however, the prevailing attitudes towards international arms transfers shifted.  
Governments of leading arms-producing states determined that the private firm was more 
adept than the state at conducting the research and development necessary to create more 
advanced weapons—weapons that may give that government a crucial, though perhaps 
ephemeral, advantage in war.  Indeed, “even technically proficient government arsenals 
like the French, British, and Prussian,” one historian writes, “faced persistent challenge 
from private manufacturers, who were never loath to point out the ways in which their 
products surpassed government-made weaponry.”45 																																																								
44 Collier (1980), 48, 50 
45 McNeill (1982), 241 
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But, in order to cover the enormous costs incurred from the research, 
development, and production of new weapons, exports were needed by these private 
firms to provide them with a source of income more stable than the irregular domestic 
demand for armaments.  As William McNeill explains, “ever since the breakaway of the 
1850s, private arms manufacturers had prospered by entering the foreign market as a way 
of increasing their income and smoothing out peaks and valleys created by fluctuating 
home demand for their products.”46  Ultimately, from the perspective of the government, 
exports came to be seen as a necessary evil outweighed by the benefits of retaining 
domestic military innovation and arms production, a line of thinking that is still used 
today to justify foreign arms sales. 
As suggested earlier, the rapid pace of innovation during the industrial age also 
made an impression on the arms industry.  With the rate at which private manufacturers 
were able to improve their armaments increasing, competition among producers became 
very intense, a characteristic of the international arms trade that has only increased in the 
years since.  In the words of another historian, for the arms industry, the period between 
1870 and World War I was an “age of mergers, of determined and often successful 
attempts by arms manufacturers to increase their share of the market by devouring their 
rivals.”47  For instance, in 1897, Armstrong’s firm would absorb one of its main 
competitors, the company of Joseph Whitworth, while other manufacturers did the same, 
buying out some companies and forming syndicates for market-sharing and price-fixing 
with others.48  The result was that by the beginning of the twentieth century, Armstrong 
																																																								
46 McNeill (1982), 291 
47 Collier (1980), 54 
48 See McNeill (1982), 290-292 or Collier (1980), 58-79 for a discussion on the various market-sharing 
agreements that existed at the time. 
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and Vickers were the only “two British armament firms comparable with Schneider et 
Compagnie in France and Friedrich Krupp AG in Germany,” the companies of the other 
two great arms manufacturers of the industrial age.49 
Thus, already by the end of the nineteenth century, due to the enormous output of 
these firms and the export-reliant nature of arms production, England, France, and 
Germany had become the foremost suppliers of arms in the world.  To illustrate this 
point, alongside Armstrong, Vickers was the other “major pillar of British arms 
production,” and the “pre-eminent international naval producer” between 1903 and 1912, 
exporting 33.9 percent of its naval armaments.50  Together, these two shipbuilders 
cornered 63 percent of the market for naval defense equipment and warships from 1900 
to 1914.51 
Across the English Channel, it is estimated that of the 90,000 cannons produced 
by Schneider-Creusot from 1885 to 1914, roughly half were sold abroad, while the 
company’s most notable domestic counterpart, the shipbuilding Forges et Chantier de la 
Méditerranée, exported 44 percent of its naval armaments between 1856 and 1899.52  Put 
another way, by the end of the nineteenth century, France had sold arms to twenty-three 
countries around the world, including Russia, Spain, Sweden, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Mexico, Chile, Japan, and the Transvaal region of southern Africa, to name a few.53 
In Germany, the company of Alfred Krupp, known as “the Cannon King,” also 
did much by way of producing and exporting arms in the latter half of the nineteenth and 																																																								
49 Collier (1980), 69 
50 Krause (1992), 58 
51 Grant (2007), 145 
52 Krause (1992), 60; France was one of the last countries to eliminate its ban on arms exports in 1885.  
However, because this law was directed at artillery (see McNeill 240), Forges et Chantier de la 
Méditerranée was, as a producer of warships, able to circumvent this prohibition. 
53 Ibid. 
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first half of the twentieth century.54  Less burdened by national export restrictions and 
similarly driven by the need to cover the enormous costs associated with arms production 
and research and development, Krupp had already gained a foothold in the international 
market by the time he received his first order from the Prussian government in 1859.55  
By 1877, over half of the nearly 25,000 cannons produced by the firm up to that point 
had been exported, and by 1914, Krupp weapons had been sold to a remarkable fifty-two 
states: twenty-three in Europe, eighteen in the Western hemisphere, six in Asia, and five 
in Africa.56  By far, the biggest customers of Krupp artillery between 1854 and 1886 were 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire, together purchasing roughly half of the Cannon King’s 
exports.57 
Notably, the United States also made its arms industry debut in this era, although 
primarily through the production of small arms and, as we will see below, gunpowder.  In 
fact, the work on firearms of several Americans in the second half of the 1800s would 
make them household names even today—the likes of Colt, Winchester, and 
Remington—men whose rifles were actively sought after all over the world.  Indeed, by 
the end of the nineteenth century, England, Germany, Russia, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, 
Japan, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Egypt, and Ottoman Turkey, among others, had 
imported the machinery necessary to produce these weapons.58  Notably, the purchase of 
the means of production, rather than the finished rifles, is indicative of another diversion 
from the arms trade of the past, and remains an aspect of many arms deals today.  That is, 																																																								
54 Muhlen (1959), 47 
55 Ibid. 44 
56 Menne (1938), 150; Muhlen (1959), 109; Collier (1980), 62; Engelbrecht and Hanighen (1934), 83; More 
recent estimates (Sköns and Weidacher (2002), 325) determine that in the late nineteenth century as much 
as 86 percent of Krupp arms production was exported.   
57 Grant (2007), 25 
58 Engelbrecht and Hanighen (1934), 38-39 
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that “the key mechanism for technological diffusion was no longer the migration of 
skilled personnel,” as in the early modern period,  “but the licence or co-production deal, 
by which entire factories and production processes were transferred as branch plants.”59 
By means of gunpowder, the United States also made a substantial contribution to 
the international arms trade, with the nineteenth century world’s largest powder-making 
firm, E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, founded in America in 1802 by a French 
immigrant.60  Although it did not produce the cannons and warships of its European 
counterparts, its patents and contributions to the global supply of gunpowder were 
substantial, and its experience in the arms business was nonetheless similar to other 
leading manufacturers of the time.  The Du Pont company, for instance, epitomized the 
intense competition and pursuit of greater market share that characterized the arms 
industry in the industrial age, buying out one hundred competitors between 1903 and 
1907 alone, sixty-four of which were immediately discontinued.61  And, like the Krupps, 
Schneiders, and Armstrongs of the time, as Du Pont’s powder-making activities 
expanded, so, too, did the company’s list of foreign customers:  by the end of the First 
World War, it had supplied the Allies with 40 percent of all the gunpowder they used 
during the war.62 
That said, for the major conventional weapons this paper is primarily concerned 
with, although much of the world was still largely dependent on English, French, and 
German armaments, this did not preclude other states from attempting to develop their 
domestic arms industries.  For example, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary (later 																																																								
59 Krause (1992), 64-65; The introduction of foreign experts in Japan as part of the Meiji Restoration serves 
as an exception to this trend. 
60 Engelbrecht and Hanighen (1934), 22-23 
61 Ibid. 34-35 
62 Ibid. 35-36 
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Czechoslovakia), and Spain had, by the outbreak of the First World War, met with some 
success in expanding internal arms production, while the industries of China, Japan, and 
the Ottoman Empire achieved less autonomy, even in light of large-scale government 
efforts to foster production.63  A crucial distinguishing feature between these industries 
and those of the big three Western European producers was that the capacity to innovate 
(and, consequently, the ability to produce competitive goods) still lay firmly with the 
private firms of the latter group, not the outmoded state-run industries of the countries 
playing catch-up with the arms industry, who tended to rely heavily on the import of 
equipment and techniques from the leading manufacturers.64 
Ultimately, the international arms trade witnessed several significant changes in 
the second half of the nineteenth century from the system that had dominated since the 
military revolution.  Foremost among these was a shift in which countries were selling 
the world its weapons.  More specifically, the technical advances of industrialization and 
the rise of laissez-faire macroeconomic ideology gave way to a new set of leading 
suppliers—namely, the private manufacturing giants of England, France, and Germany, 
which were now firmly at the helm of global arms production after having supplanted 
government reliance on state arsenals.  Again, the assessment of William McNeill is 
instructive: “A global, industrialized armaments business thus emerged in the 
1860s…[which]…quite eclipsed the artisanal manufacture of arms for international sale 
that had been centered in the Low Countries ever since the fifteenth century.” 65  
Ultimately, this oligopolistic organization of the arms trade would continue into the 
																																																								
63 Krause (1992), 72 
64 Ibid. 64-70 
65 McNeill (1982), 241 
	 19	
interwar period and become even more acute, despite widespread popular condemnation 
of the arms industry prompted by the horrific slaughter of the First World War. 
 
THE INTERWAR YEARS 
For the arms industry, the period between the two world wars was in many ways a 
continuation of the system and trends that had taken root in the previous century.  
England and France, for instance, retained their positions as top global suppliers of arms, 
as did Germany by the mid 1930s, following slightly over a decade of relative adherence 
to the disarmament mandated by the Treaty of Versailles.  Moreover, and somewhat 
surprisingly, the laissez-faire system of exchange that had governed arms transfers in the 
nineteenth century also survived the First World War in spite of growing public 
animosity towards the arms industry, its unscrupulous trading practices, and the 
subsequent establishment of export restrictions and government regulations aimed at 
reining in private manufacturers.  At the same time, as we will see below, new producers 
began challenging the dominance of the English, French, and German armaments trio, 
including Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and the United States, among others.  Thus, in the 
words of Keith Krause, “although the First World War marked a decisive historical 
discontinuity in many realms, the interwar international arms transfer system was 
characterised more by the continued evolution of the existing system, albeit distorted by 
the appearance of novel factors.”66 
 First, as mentioned above, the extension of laissez-faire economic principles into 
the 1920s and 30s with regards to arms exports was one such evolution.  In most cases for 
the majority of the interwar period, arms companies sold their wares abroad with little 																																																								
66 Krause (1992), 72 
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adherence to the political developments and strategic alignments of the time, as had been 
practice in the nineteenth century.  Indeed, table 1 shows that rather than following 
prevailing alliance networks, arms transfers more typically occurred independent of 
diplomatic ties, with the majority of states in the international market procuring their 
military equipment from multiple suppliers, the expected outcome of the 
Sole	Supplier Recipient Predominant	Supplier Recipient
United	Kingdom: Egypt United	Kingdom: Australia
Saudi	Arabia Canada
New	Zealand Ireland
Estonia
Greece
Iraq
Latvia
Portugal
United	States: Cuba United	States: Dominican	Republic
Haiti Mexico
Honduras Colobmia
Nicaragua
Italy: Albania Italy: Afghanistan
Ecuador
Hungary
Paraguay
Nationalist	Spain
France: Costa	Rica
Poland
Germany: Bulgaria
Notes:																a
							b
							c
Source: Robert	E.	Harkavy,	The	Arms	Trade	and	International	Systems,	(Cambridge:	Ballinger	Publishing	
Company,	1975)	115,	104-105
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Netherlands
All	arms	transferred	to	recipients	were	supplied	by	a	single	state.
Sixty	percent	or	more	of	arms	transferred	to	recipients	were	supplied	by	a	single	state.
No	single	state	supplied	over	59	percent	of	arms	transferred	to	a	given	recipient.
Uruguay
Finland
Iran
Lithuania
Norway
Peru
Romania
El	Salvador
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
Guatemala
Table	1:	Interwar	Arms	Transfer	Patterns,	by	Acquisition	Style
Sole	Suppliera Predominant	Supplierb Multiple	Suppliersc
Recipients
Ethiopia
Loyalist	Spain
South	Africa
Belgium
Czechoslovakia
Argentina
Austria
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
China
Denmark
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freewheeling and ‘casual’ trade described above.  American and German arms transfers 
provide further evidence: up until the late 1930s, the United States was still exporting 
arms to Germany and Japan, while at the same time “even the Germans…were selling 
arms to imminent victims such as Holland, Romania, Greece, and Yugoslavia right up to 
the eve of the war.”67  In the assessment of Robert E. Harkavy, author of what remains to 
this day the premier study of the interwar arms trade, “the looseness with which the 
governments of the interwar period allowed their arms traders to operate somewhat 
outside the mainstream of diplomacy up to the middle or late 1930s must be viewed as 
somewhat of an atavism, a remnant of a past era of less than total war.”68 
 The survival of laissez faire trading practices is surprising considering the striking 
shift in public sentiment towards arms manufacturers during the interwar years, a 
development that has since come to characterize the arms trade of this period.  A number 
of factors gave rise to this furor.  Clearly, the unprecedented and senseless carnage of 
trench warfare still loomed heavy in the minds of many around the world.  Indeed, much 
of the public outrage for the Great War was ultimately directed at the private arms 
manufacturers, whose aggressive and often heedless distribution of weapons in the 
decades beforehand was subject to great criticism.69  The practices of these “salesmen 
and freewheeling entrepreneurs [who]…roamed the world, selling to all comers” were 
frequently scandalized, and not wholly without cause.70  Krupp, for instance, never one to 
allow “his private interests to be affected by national animosities,” vigorously and openly 
pursued sales to both Austria and France before their wars with Prussia in 1866 and 1870, 
																																																								
67 Harkavy (1975), 33 
68 Ibid. 
69 Laurance (1992), 72 
70 Harkavy (1975), 35 
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respectively, even succeeding in the case of Austria, despite pleas for restraint from his 
home government.71  Krupp’s actions, though conspicuous, were not atypical of the 
industry.  As George Thayer notes: 
 
World War I is full of examples of one nation finding its own weapons being used by its 
enemies.  For instance, when Germany invaded Belgium, its soldiers were met by 
Belgians armed with German guns; when the Germans invaded Russia they were met by 
Russians armed with Krupp cannons; French troops in Bulgaria were bombarded by 
Bulgarians firing French 75’s; Austria-Hungary, with its Skoda factory, faced Skoda guns 
in the hands of Russians.  Even Switzerland, a neutral, helped this process: it sold 
electricity to both sides and allowed French material for the Germans and German 
material for the Allies to be exchanged through its territory.72 
 
Perhaps more surprising is the testimony given in the mid 1930s by Admiral Sir Reginald 
Bacon during Great Britain’s Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and 
Trading in Arms, one of two prominent government investigations into the activities of 
arms producers: 
 
I have seen it stated that British ammunition was used against our troops at Gallipoli.  
That is very likely–why should it not be?  I think at that particular moment German 
ammunition was probably a little better than ours, but the main point is that, if they had 
																																																								
71 Menne (1938), 94, 80-81, 90-93; Noel-Baker (1937), 54 
72 Thayer (1969), 29 
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not used English ammunition, they would have used German, which would have been to 
the disadvantage of our troops.73 
 
The Great Depression likely also contributed to public distaste for the arms 
industry.  In the words of Harkavy again, “it was probably not altogether accidental that 
heightened criticism of the laissez faire activities of arms makers occurred in the 
immediate wake of the Great Depression, when widespread doubts had emerged about 
the general viability of the capitalist system.”74  Reflecting this sentiment, the academic 
literature on the arms trade from the 1930s is replete with examples of arms industry 
exposés, muckraking pieces, and other attempts to shine light on the perceived ‘evils’ of 
the industry.75   
 Governments were consequently pushed into regulatory positions.  Calls for 
nationalization and decreased arms production were met with the application of a variety 
of export controls such that “by the late 1930s, the governments of most or all major 
nations were monitoring and licensing arms exports.”76  The efforts of the League of 
Nations, through its various conferences on the matter and annual publication of the 
Armaments Year Book since 1924, bolstered these regulatory developments.  
Additionally, this period also saw the conception of end-user certificates, an export 
control still popular today in which the recipient country pledges not to re-export or 
																																																								
73 As quoted in Thayer (1969), 32-33; The Nye Committee, which took place in the United States, was the 
other investigation. 
74 Harkavy (1975), 36 
75 See, for instance, Merchants of Death: A Study of the International Arms Trade (1934) by Engelbrecht 
and Hanighen, Iron, Blood, and Profits (1934) by George Seldes, or The Private Manufacture of 
Armaments (1937) by Philip Noel-Baker. 
76 Harkavy (1975), 37 
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otherwise transfer the arms it receives.77  As one scholar on the international arms trade 
writes, “In short, the idea that ‘arms are not refrigerators’ was codified on a national and 
international basis” for the first time in the 1930s, and “the moral aspect of exporting 
arms…shifted from industry to government.”78  Notably, much of the renewed public 
concern over the arms industry today is not much unlike the criticism during the interwar 
period. 
 Nevertheless, many of these attempts at regulation were ineffectual.  In the case 
of Great Britain, for instance, which was still one of the principal arms exporters in the 
world, “controls had apparently been circumvented almost at will, partly via 
transshipments through foreign subsidiaries.”79  And even if this hadn’t been the case, the 
British government in the early 1930s “seems to have passed almost automatically on 
virtually all arms export license requests.”80  This situation is reflected in table 2 on the 
following page, where the United Kingdom’s standing as an arms producer is 
unmistakable: with the exception of combat aircraft, the UK supplied over 25 percent of 
arms on the global market in all categories—and as much as 58.9 percent in the case of 
warships.  Moreover, the persisting laissez faire approach to weapons transfers in spite of 
growing restrictions on the arms trade is further evidenced by European sales to China 
around the time of its civil war in the early twentieth century: as Keith Krause points out, 
despite the 1919 Arms Embargo Agreement “nominally adhered to by most 
																																																								
77 Laurance (1992), 186; See also Bromley and Griffiths, End-User Certificates: Improving Standards to 
Prevent Diversion (2010) 
78 Laurance (1992), 186 
79 Harkavy (1975), 36 
80 Ibid. 
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suppliers…every major [arms] seller took advantage of the chaos in China to sell 
weapons there.”81 
 
 																																																								
81 Krause (1992), 74; See Chan (1982), 59-65 for a discussion on the extent of these arms sales. 
United	Kingdom 28.6 25.0 17.3 58.9 26.1
France 22.0 10.7 15.6 10.1 27.9
Germany — 10.9 9.5 — 4.1
United	States 20.2d 9.9 22.8 2.3 14.7
Italy 1.8 3.7 12.7 17.8 10.9
Czechoslovakia 4.3 12.6 <2.2 — 6.9
Sweden 3.5 8.1 <2.2 — 3.1
USSR — — 5.6 — 5.6
Poland — 0.1e 2.2 — 0.7
Japan 0.3 5.8e <2.2 3.9 —
Netherlands 2.2 3.1e 3.0 — —
Spain 3.7 1.5e — 3.9 —
Belgium 1.7 5.0 <2.2 — —
Others 4.0 3.6e 11.3f 3.1g None
Notes:														a
							b
							c
							d
							e
							f
							g
Sources: Column	1:Column	2:Columns	3-5:
Table	2:	Interwar	International	Arms	Trade	Market	Shares,	by	Suppliera
Country 1920-8																																							
League	of	Nationsb
1929-37
Sloutzkib
1930-39																																											
Combat	Aircraftc
1930-39
Warshipsc
1930-39	
Tanksc
Nokhim Sloutzki, The World Armaments Race, 1919-1939 (Geneva:
Geneva	Research	Centre,	1941),	71
Robert E. Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems,
(Cambridge:	Ballinger	Publishing	Company,	1975)	61,	74,	69
The League reports the US share for this period as 27.9 percent, but, as Krause notes, the
figure "is inflated by the inclusion of transfers from 1920, when the US accounted for 52.1
percent of global trends. This may be a statistical artifact." The figure reported in the table is
the	US	share	for	1921-8.
League	of	Nations	data	used	for	these	states.		Sloutzki	calculates	14.1	percent	market	share	for	
"Others", which includes Poland, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain, among others. The total
market	share	of	this	group	was	subtracted	from	14.1	to	arrive	at	3.6.
This table follows the structure found in Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military
Production	and	Trade,	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1992)	74
The League of Nations and Sloutzki calculations include only heavy equipment and small arms,
excluding	aircraft	and	naval	transfers.
Dashes	in	these	columns	indicate	no	contribution	to	the	global	arms	trade	for	this	category.
Figure includes states above contributing <2.2 percent. Additional suppliers include Canada,
Switzerland,	Denmark,	Yugoslavia,	and	Mexico,	also	each	contributing	<2.2	percent.
Other suppliers include Portugal and Estonia, contributing <2.3 percent each, and collectively
3.1	percent.
League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook of the Trade in Arms and
Ammunition	(Geneva:	League	of	Nations,	annual,	1924-38)
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Additionally, although temporarily absent from the international arms trade—and 
ostensibly in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles—Germany quickly returned to 
reclaim a considerable portion of the market.  By 1929, it was the primary supplier of 
arms for thirteen states, and just a year later, twenty-two.82  However, because much of 
Germany’s arms production during this period was meant to build up its own military and 
consequently not exported, its contributions to the global arms trade as seen in table 2 
belie the robustness of its defense industry.  In fact, it was not long after the Paris Peace 
Conference that Germany began its clandestine process of rearmament: in addition to 
cannon and U-boat production in German-owned Swedish and Dutch firms, as well as 
subcontracting of arms production to Belgian, Swiss, and Spanish companies, hidden 
tank production within Germany itself began in 1928, while Krupp factories resumed 
production in 1933.83  Nevertheless, Germany’s partial withdrawal from the international 
market in concert with its subcontracting of production to foreign states help explain the 
increase in market share for countries like Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, whose 
companies were busy filling German orders.84 
A final feature in the table requiring explanation is the rather sudden emergence 
of Czechoslovakia as an arms-producing powerhouse.  More specifically, between the 
1920s and 1930s, Czechoslovakia’s share of global arms transfers nearly tripled, rising 
from 4.3 percent to 12.6 percent.  This increase was primarily due to the business of the 
country’s Skoda Works firm, which, with support from the Czechoslovakian government, 																																																								
82 Thayer (1969), 33 
83 Krause (1992), 77; Harkavy (1975), 33, 39-40; With “arms firms of opposing nations…normally 
intertwined by interlocking directorates and stock ownership,” such interconnectedness was common in the 
arms industry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, ultimately becoming one of the chief 
concerns of critics of the arms trade writing in the 30s who “insisted on seeing something insidious in the 
multinational nature of the arms industry.” 
84 Krause (1992), 77 
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in addition to enormous orders from Hitler’s Germany, exported approximately 40 
percent of its military output.85  Ultimately, the growth of suppliers like Czechoslovakia, 
Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands served largely to displace the dominance inherited 
by the three principal producers of the pre-war era. 
Lastly, table 3 on the following page shows Harkavy’s dependence levels system, 
which illustrates the degree of autarky found in arms industries throughout the world 
during the interwar period.  The table makes several features of the 1930s arms trade 
clear.  First, the strength of German, British, and French military industries is reinforced: 
with the exception of French aircraft, all three states were at the forefront of research, 
development, and production in every category of armaments.  In terms of changes from 
the prewar era, the table also reflects the ascension of Japan’s defense industry, among 
others, from relative obscurity to international prominence, a fact that is also evident in 
the previous table, where it is shown that Japan’s market share jumped drastically from 
0.3 percent in the 1920s to 5.8 percent in the 1930s. 
Perhaps most striking, however, is the emergence of the United States as a top-tier 
arms supplier, no longer just of gunpowder and rifles, but in all categories of weapons.  
American dominance in the aircraft industry was particularly strong, and foreshadowed 
its role as an aerospace giant through the post-war period and into the twenty-first 
century.  For instance, in addition to its role as the foremost supplier of combat aircraft 
from 1930-39 (table 2), the United States also claimed 42.8 percent of the market for 
helicopters and over half of the market for transport aircraft (53.6 percent) in the same 
period.86 																																																								
85 Krause (1992), 75; Thayer (1969), 34 
86 Harkavy (1975), 64, 67 
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What is not clear from either table, however, is the massive transformation of the 
Soviet arms industry by the late 1930s.  Military production levels increased drastically 
Weapons	System Level
1
2
3
6
2
3
4
5
6
2
3
4
5
6
2
3
4
6
Naval
1 United	States,	Germany,	United	Kingdom,	France,	Italy,	Sweden,	
Netherlands,	Denmark,	Norway
Japan
USSR,	Spain
Australia,	Argentina,	Yugoslavia
Note: Harkavy's dependence level system separates states into six categories according to their capacity to
produce arms independently. In the words of the author, these separations should not be considered
"discrete compartments" as much as arbitrary breaks belonging to a "graduated and complex continuum
running from total independence to total dependence." The levels decrease in terms of 'armaments-autarky',
with level 1 "referring to complete independence in research and development as well as production for
given weapons systems," all the way down to level 6, describing nations that have "no production facilities,
much	less	research	and	development	capability...usually,	no	such	capability	has	ever	existed."
Source: Robert E. Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing
Company,	1975)	192,	184-187
China,	South	Africa,	Hungary,	Mexico,	Turkey,	Norway,	New	
Zealand,	Bulgaria
All	remaining	nations
Armor
1 United	States,	Germany,	United	Kingdom,	France,	Italy,	
Czechoslovakia
Japan
USSR,	Sweden,	South	Africa
Poland,	Switzerland,	Hungary,	Austria
Netherlands,	Yugoslavia,	Belgium,	Romania
All	remaining	nations
All	remaining	nations
Brazil,	Turkey,	Finland,	Portugal
All	remaining	nations
Small	Arms
1 United	States,	Germany,	United	Kingdom,	USSR,	France,	Italy,	
Sweden,	Belgium,	Czechoslovakia,	Switzerland,	Denmark
Japan
Australia,	Poland,	Netherlands,	Yugoslavia
Canada,	Spain,	Argentina,	Austria,	Finland,	Portugal,	Romania,	Iran
5
Table	3:	Summary	of	Interwar	Dependence	Levels,	by	Weapons	System
Countries
Aircraft
Germany,	United	Kingdom,	United	States
France,	Poland,	Netherlands
USSR,	Japan,	Sweden,	Czechoslovakia
4 Canada,	Spain,	Yugoslavia,	Belgium,	South	Africa,	Switzerland,	
Denmark,	Norway,	Greece,	Romania,	Thailand
5 China,	Australia,	Argentina,	Brazil,	Hungary,	Mexico,	Turkey,	
Austria,	Chile,	Bulgaria,	Finland,	Lithuania
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between 1930 and 1939, even by a factor of ten in the case of aircraft.87  Much of this 
occurred not through private innovation but by the copying of foreign arms deliberately 
purchased in small quantities so they could be reproduced domestically on a large scale.  
Nevertheless, these developments foreshadowed the role the USSR would play alongside 
the United States as a chief supplier of arms in the post-war world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
87 Krause (1992), 78 
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III. 1950 TO PRESENT: A STATISTICAL OVERVIEW88 
 
The founders of the modern military-industrial complex were not a great deal different in their 
motives than the latter-day board chairman of Lockheed or General Dynamics, nor did they 
necessarily part company with the military inventors who preceded them.89 
-Robert O’Connell, Of Arms and Men 
 
THE COLD WAR 
Along with the rest of the world, the international arms trade entered a new era following 
the Second World War.  With the Soviet Union and United States at the helm, a bipolar 
and ideologically charged system superseded the freewheeling arms transfer arrangement 
that had developed and matured during the steam age.  Fortunately, relative to previous 
periods, a wealth of data has been collected on arms transfers since 1950.  This section 
will consequently provide a much more data-driven analysis of the period in question, 
focusing in particular on four striking trends that emerge from the data on the Cold War 
arms trade: first, the shift in the world’s top suppliers, already mentioned above; second, 
the tremendous increase in the volume of weapons transferred; third, the shift in the 
recipient market towards the developing world; and fourth, the drastic increase in the cost 
of the arms themselves, a trend which had already begun under the previous system. 
Beginning with the first trend, table 4 on the next page shows the extent of Soviet 
and American dominance of the supply side of the market.  Individually, these two states 
																																																								
88 Unless otherwise cited, values and figures in this section are based on author’s calculations using data 
from SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Database.  Additionally, unless otherwise noted, all dollar values in tables 
and figures from 1950 to present that use the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 
Arms Transfer Database as their source are in SIPRI Trend-Indicator Values (TIV), which do not 
necessarily reflect the actual total cost of an arms deal.  Rather, SIPRI uses TIV to assign values to arms 
transfers based on the combined unit costs of all weapons systems delivered.  TIV consequently serve as a 
common unit for identifying and comparing trends in arms transfers across time and regions.  For a more 
complete explanation of SIPRI TIV and the data used in this section, please see Appendix A. 
89 O’Connell (1989), 195 
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supplied at least a third of all the arms on the international market throughout the Cold 
War.  The only exception to this was the United States in the 1980s, during which it 
contributed 29.7 percent to global exports.  Nevertheless, together, the two superpowers 
cornered well over 60 percent of the market in each decade from 1950 through 1980.  At 
 
the height of their market power in the 60s, they supplied 77.1 percent of all 
internationally traded arms.  At their lowest point in the 1980s, they supplied 65.8 
percent.  For both superpowers, arms transfers during the Cold War served as one method 
to influence the balance of power between communism and capitalism in the contested 
areas of the world, pushing both states to maintain their high market shares. 
Other major suppliers at the time included the United Kingdom, France, and West 
Germany, whose historical capacity for arms production had not been wholly erased by 
Country 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89
Soviet	Union 34.2 39.3 38.0 36.1
United	States 35.2 37.8 35.1 29.7
United	Kingdom 21.4 6.7 5.9 6.2
France 2.3 5.6 6.9 7.6
West	Germany 0.1 1.7 3.8 4.2
China 0.5 1.4 2.0 3.7
Czechoslovakia 3.4 1.6 2.0 2.7
Italy 0.6 1.0 1.5 2.3
Netherlands 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.3
Switzerland 0.0 1.5 0.6 1.0
Sweden 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6
Poland 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.5
Canada 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.4
All	Others 0.4 1.0 1.8 3.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:
Table	4:	Cold	War	Market	Shares	Per	Decade,	by	State
SIPRI	Arms	Transfers	Database,	Accessed	05	March	2016
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the destruction of the Second World War.  In fact, although much of Europe’s 
infrastructure, housing, and industrial equipment had been devastated, its industrial 
capacity remained largely intact.  As one economic historian has noted, “the speed with 
which physical damage could be repaired was a lesson of the Allied experience with 
strategic bombing, the impact of which on enemy war production had been less than 
anticipated.”90 
Indeed, as shown above in table 4, England was still able to supply 21.4 percent 
of arms on the global market in the aftermath of the war during the 1950s.  By the next 
decade, the UK remained the world’s third largest arms producer, despite the fact that its 
share of global exports had dropped by more than half.  In addition to the increases in 
Soviet and American exports, England’s loss of market share is also at least partially 
attributable to the resurgence of other European producers.  France’s arms industry, for 
instance, quickly rebounded in the decades following 1945 and was by the 1960s 
supplying 5.6 percent of arms on the international market.  West Germany’s market share 
rose during this period as well, although to a lesser extent.  Notably, unlike its French and 
British counterparts, the German arms industry in the 50s and 60s was kept small, 
supplying primarily its own Bundeswehr and operating under stringent export 
restrictions, in part due to political fiascoes arising from sales to the developing world, 
and in part a result of “memories of militarism, the Krupp empire…[and] the heritage of 
the Second World War.”91  Nevertheless, by the mid 1970s, many of these constraints on 
exports had been loosened as a result of economic and political pressures, a fact reflected 
																																																								
90 Eichengreen (2008), 52 
91 Brzoska and Ohlson (1987), 89; Pierre (1982), 111 
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in the rise in Germany’s market share for that decade. 92   Ultimately, these five 
producers—the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom, France, and West 
Germany—together claimed an astounding 93.1 percent of the international market in the 
1950s.  By the 1980s, this figure had decreased by only 10 percent to 83.8 percent. 
Accompanying the table is figure 1, seen below, which shows the total value of 
arms exports by state for each decade of the Cold War.  As revealed in the figure, 
 
 
 
although Soviet and American market shares peaked in the 1960s, the total value of their 
arms sales did not.  In fact, at its height in the 1980s, the USSR sold nearly $147 billion 
worth of arms to around 40 foreign states,93 more than double the $67 billion it had sold 
in the 1950s.  Furthermore, with the exception of the 1950s, the Soviet Union sent more 																																																								
92 Brzoska and Ohlson (1987), 89 
93 Turner and SIPRI (1985), 69 
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weapons abroad in terms of value than the United States in each ten-year period, with the 
gap widening considerably by the 70s and 80s.  US exports, more specifically, peaked in 
the 1970s at $125 billion, slightly less than twice the $68 billion it had sent abroad in the 
50s. 
The tendency for the volume of arms exports to increase as the Cold War 
intensified was not unique to the Soviet Union and United States, but was rather the 
general trend for all major suppliers of the time.  France, for instance, increased exports 
by a factor of over six—from roughly $4.5 billion in the 1950s to over $30 billion by the 
1980s—while China and West Germany both went from exporting less than one billion 
dollars worth of arms in the 1950s to 15 and 17 billion, respectively, by the 80s.  China, 
consequently, was by this time also a significant arms-producing state, even if the 
majority of its weapons were often considered badly outmoded.94  As shown previously 
in table 4, by the 1980s, China was the world’s sixth largest supplier, providing 3.7 
percent of arms on the international market. 
This tremendous increase in exports across all major suppliers during the Cold 
War is the second trend evident in the data on global arms transfers.  On the following 
page, figure 2 traces the total volume of the arms trade in billions of dollars since 1950.  
Beginning at just over $8 billion, exports rose sharply in the early 50s and then again in 
the 70s, ultimately peaking in 1982 at nearly $46 billion.  From then until the second half 
of the 90s, the global diffusion of weapons slowed down substantially.  By 1991, the year 
of the Soviet Union’s collapse, arms exports had fallen to just over $28 billion.  Some 
explanation for this enormous growth in arms transfers can be found in the final two 
																																																								
94 Pierre (1982), 225 
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trends of the Cold War arms trade, which concern the third world’s increasing demand 
for arms and the soaring cost of the weapons themselves. 
 
 
 
 
The skyrocketing volume of arms exports during the Cold War illustrated above 
begs the question: who’s importing all of these weapons?  Table 5 shows the top ten arms 
importers for each 10-year segment of the Cold War and provides some preliminary 
results.  Starting with the 1950s, it is apparent that weapons at that time were primarily 
traded amongst the arms-producing states themselves, as has historically been the case.  
In other words, when the top ten importers of the 1950s from table 5 are compared with 
the world’s  top producers from table 4,  it is evident  that these are by and large the same 
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Period Rank Country Imports	($	Billions) Percent	Total
1 China 27.7 14.2
2 United	States 12.4 6.4
3 France 10.5 5.4
4 Poland 9.2 4.8
5 Canada 8.6 4.4
6 West	Germany	(FRG) 7.9 4.1
7 Czechoslovakia 6.8 3.5
8 Soviet	Union 6.5 3.3
9 Netherlands 6.0 3.1
10 Belgium 5.5 2.8
Others 93.6 48.1
Total 194.6 100.0
1 West	Germany	(FRG) 23.6 10.4
2 Egypt 10.5 4.6
3 India 10.1 4.4
4 Poland 9.7 4.3
5 East	Germany	(GDR) 9.2 4.0
6 United	Kingdom 7.0 3.1
7 Czechoslovakia 6.8 3.0
8 Japan 6.7 2.9
9 Canada 6.6 2.9
10 Italy 5.5 2.4
Others 131.3 57.9
Total 226.8 100.0
1 Iran 28.5 8.0
2 Libya 18.0 5.1
3 Syria 15.3 4.3
4 India 14.9 4.2
5 West	Germany	(FRG) 13.5 3.8
6 Israel 13.4 3.8
7 Egypt 12.8 3.6
8 Iraq 10.6 3.0
9 Japan 10.2 2.9
10 Poland 9.8 2.8
Others 209.7 58.8
Total 356.8 100.0
1 India 30.5 7.5
2 Iraq 29.9 7.3
3 Japan 17.8 4.4
4 Saudi	Arabia 16.1 4.0
5 Syria 15.2 3.7
6 Egypt 12.7 3.1
7 Libya 12.5 3.1
8 Soviet	Union 10.7 2.6
9 South	Korea 8.9 2.2
10 Netherlands 8.6 2.1
Others 244.6 60.0
Total 407.5 100.0
Source: SIPRI	Arms	Transfers	Database,	Accessed	05	March	2016
Table	5:	Top	10	Cold	War	Arms	Importers,	by	State
1950-59
1960-69
1970-79
1980-89
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states.  Collectively, this group of ten accounted for just over half of all imports during 
the 1950s. 
Notably, China, the biggest recipient of all during this period, was responsible for 
14.2 percent of all imports, more than twice the amount of arms taken in by the United 
States, the world’s second largest importer at that time.  By way of explanation, in the 
early to mid 50s, China was a major beneficiary of Soviet military aid.  But, after its 
relations with the USSR deteriorated at the end of the decade, so did the bulk of Chinese 
arms imports—not only did the flow of Soviet military equipment cease, China also lost 
somewhat its access to Western armaments as the governments of these countries became 
wary of the consequences their exports to China may have on inciting conflict between 
the USSR and China, or between the USSR and the West itself.95  The minimal amount 
of arms the Chinese did import during the rest of the Cold War was used primarily for the 
purpose of building up their own defense industry: as Frederic Pearson writes, China 
apparently “sought to import foreign weapons mainly in order to better perfect its own 
domestic designs, which it then reexports,” historically a popular strategy among states 
playing catch-up with the arms industry.96  Ultimately, although China remained a minor 
player in the arms trade throughout the 50s, 60s, and 70s, its role grew substantially in the 
80s as a result of economic and political changes.97   
By the 1960s, the beginnings of a shift in the demand side are visible in table 5.  
Although top arms-producing states such as West Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
Czechoslovakia were still among the world’s largest importers, the ten largest recipients 
accounted now for just over 40 percent of total imports; clearly, other states were 																																																								
95 Pierre (1982), 225-228 
96 Pearson (1994), 49 
97 Brzoska and Ohlson (1987), 83 
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becoming more important consumers of arms.  Indeed, the rise of Egypt and India as the 
world’s second and third largest recipients in the 1960s is indicative of the emergence of 
the developing world as a key area for foreign arms sales.  By the 1970s, the only 
remaining major arms-producing state on the list of top importers was West Germany, 
with 3.8 percent of the world’s imports.  In both the 70s and the 80s, developing 
countries—in particular, Middle Eastern and North African ones such as Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—became the arms-producing world’s biggest 
foreign customers. 
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Figure	3:	Total	Value	of	Arms	Imports	Since	1950,	Stacked	by	
Region	
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Source:
Note: For the countries included in each region, please see Appendix B. Additionally, the reader is asked to
note that the 'Developed World' in this figure includes the 37 countries considered "advanced economies" by
the International Monetary Fund, although the Czech Republic, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia,
Slovenia,	and	South	Korea	are	only	included	in	this	'region'	for	observations	after	1989.
SIPRI	Arms	Transfers	Database,	Accessed	05	March	2016
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On the previous page, figure 3 decomposes all documented arms imports during 
the post-war period by region, showing changes in the flow of arms over five-year 
intervals.  Notably, the trend suggested by movements in the top ten importers of each 
decade, as described earlier, is confirmed by the figure.  Thus, the third trend of the Cold 
War arms transfer system, and the most striking feature of figure 3, is the emergence of 
developing countries—the “third world,” as it is referred to in most contemporary studies 
of the period—as buyers of primarily Western and Eastern Bloc arms. 
Throughout the post-war era, imports by the developed world and Eastern & 
Central Europe remained relatively flat as compared with other regions.  From 1955 
through 1989, for example, the developed world steadily imported between 45 and 60 
billion dollars worth of arms over each five-year period.  Eastern & Central Europe, after 
increasing its intake of arms from approximately $15 billion to $27 billion between 1950 
and 1964, remained even flatter: from 1965 through 1989, its imports over each five-year 
period hovered within 1 billion of $26 billion, with the lion’s share of the armaments  
flowing either to the Soviet Union or from there to its satellite states—Bulgaria, 
Romania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland, to highlight a few notable 
recipients.  Thus, it is unsurprising that the collapse of demand for arms in this region 
corresponds to the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War in 1991. 
 In the rest of the world, demand for military equipment exploded.  Foremost 
among the consuming regions was the Middle East, which, with its newfound oil wealth 
and a host of incessant regional rivalries (Israel and Egypt, Iraq and Iran, for instance),98 
went from importing only $2.7 billion of arms in 1950-54 to more than 20 times that 																																																								
98 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third World, (1975), 201-
202 
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amount (over $60 billion) at its height in the first half of the 80s.  Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America followed suit: in Asia & Oceania, for instance, imports nearly doubled from $22 
billion in the early 50s to $43 billion in the second half of the 80s.  Central & South 
America also peaked in the 80s at roughly $18 billion, six times the $3 billion it had 
imported in the first half of the 1950s.  Astoundingly, African arms imports, which were 
valued at less than half a billion dollars in the period 1950-54, soared to over $31 billion 
by the second half of the 70s. 
On the following page, figures 4 and 5 reinforce this trend of rapidly increasing 
developing world demand for defense equipment (as well as the relative decline of 
Western and Eastern bloc imports) by showing the arms imported by each region as a 
percentage of the total near the start and end of the Cold War.  As seen in the figures, the 
developed world, which was the recipient of nearly half of all exports in the 1950s, was 
by the 1980s the destination of only 27 percent of arms.  Similarly, the Eastern Bloc’s 
share of imports also declined, falling from 19 percent to just 12 percent over the same 
period.  At the same time, the rest of the world’s share of defense imports grew from 34 
percent to over 62 percent—nearly two thirds of all arms transfers in the 80s.  Notably, 
the Middle East, at 27 percent, was in the 1980s the destination for more foreign-based 
armaments in terms of value than the developed world. 
Several factors likely fueled the developing world’s demand for arms.  Certainly, 
the intense ideological rivalry between Soviet communism and Western capitalism, the 
defining characteristic of the period, was a leading contributor.  Throughout the Cold 
War, both sides eagerly peddled their arms to contested countries in the developing world 
in an effort to advance their cause.  To make this idea more concrete, between 1980 and    
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Figure	4:	Cold	War	Arms	Imports,	by	Region	
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Source: SIPRI	Arms	Transfers	Database,	Accessed	05	March	2016
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1985, the Soviet Union and United States together supplied some 119 countries with 
arms.99  In fact, as Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot write, “the Soviet Union was so eager 
to cement favourable military relationships with its allies and fill their arsenals with 
Soviet defence equipment that some analysts estimate up to two-thirds of all Soviet arms 
exports were provided either free or on credit.” 100   Thus, for the world’s two 
superpowers, sending weapons instead of troops allowed them to prop up ideologically 
sympathetic governments (or support the guerrilla movements against unfriendly ones) 
while avoiding the direct military engagements that could turn the Cold War hot.  Both 
sides, in other words, saw arms transfers in the post-war period as a convenient tool for 
achieving political goals.  Referring back to figure 2 (page 35), this provides one 
explanation for the explosion of transfers in the 50s and, in particular, the 70s.  Indeed, as 
the policy of détente took over US-Soviet relations in the 1970s and direct tensions 
between the two superpowers diminished, it appears that both states took the liberty of 
escalating their rivalry indirectly by increasing their arms transfers to the third world. 
 Complementing this was the process of decolonization, which provided the world 
with numerous newly independent states throughout the twentieth century.  As primarily 
developing countries, these states typically had little domestic arms production capacity, 
but were now nevertheless responsible for their own national defense.  As a result, 
decolonized states were often left with no choice but to import their arms.  Several of 
these states found their way to the top of the importing list in table 5, shown earlier.  
India, for instance, which gained independence from Britain in 1947, was by the 1960s 
among the five biggest arms importers in the world.  In the 1980s, it was number one.  																																																								
99 Turner and SIPRI (1985), 69 
100 Stohl and Grillot (2009), 47 
	 43	
Similarly, much of the Middle East and North Africa—the likes of Libya, Syria, Iraq, and 
Egypt—which crowded the list of top importers in the latter decades of the Cold War, 
were all decolonized before or shortly after the end of the Second World War. 
A final post-war development contributing to this demand for arms is the 
increasing frequency of both intra and interstate conflict.  This phenomenon is well 
documented.101  The incidence of civil wars, in particular, has increased significantly 
since World War II, the vast majority of which have “occurred in the recently 
decolonized, or postcolonial, regions of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and to a lesser 
extent in the Caribbean and in Central and South America.”102  Indeed, research has 
shown that not only was the incidence of civil wars in 1990 nearly four times higher than 
levels in 1950, the average duration of these conflicts has increased as well.103  In terms 
of interstate conflicts, one needs only to look to the various ethnic schisms, border 
disputes, or struggles for regional power that have populated the years since World War 
II, many of which remain unresolved to this day.  Israel and Egypt in the 1960s and 70s, 
Iran and Iraq in the 80s, or the ongoing border disputes between India, Pakistan, and 
China are just a few examples of conflicts which fueled demand for the latest weapons.104 
Lastly, the fourth trend that will be discussed in this section is the skyrocketing 
price of arms since the end of the Second World War.  Indeed, according to Maurice and 
Pearton, “since 1945 the most striking characteristic of modern weapons production has 
been its ever increasing demand on funds.”105  Again referring back to figure 2, this 																																																								
101 See, for instance, Collier et al. (2003), Hegre (2004), Collier and Hoeffler (2007), or Henderson (2008). 
102 Henderson (2008), 260; See Collier et al (2003), 112-115 for a breakdown of the incidence of civil wars 
by region. 
103 Hegre (2004), 243-244; Collier et al (2003), 82 
104 For a more exhaustive list of Cold War conflicts in the developing world (up to 1979), see Whynes 
(1979), 17-20.   
105 Stanley and Pearton (1972), 5 
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fourth trend provides another general explanation for the tremendous increase in volume 
of arms exports during the Cold War (as well as its resurgence since the late 1990s, 
which will be discussed in the next section).  As production and R&D costs soar, so does 
the burden on firms’ budgets, many of which are consequently pushed into pursuing 
export sales to compensate.  Indeed, from previous sections, we know this is historically 
the arms industry’s first line of defense.  In the words of the same scholars as above, 
“today, the remorseless upward march of costs has made an export market almost a 
precondition for the development of an expensive weapon.”106 
On the following page, table 6 captures this trend by listing the unit costs of 
various models of US fighter planes, bombers, aircraft carriers, and attack submarines.  
As seen in the table, an American P-47, adjusted for inflation, cost approximately $1.3 
million per unit during World War II.  By the second half of the 1970s, the Air Force was 
purchasing fighter jets at roughly $54 million a piece. 
Much of these increases in costs have to do with advances in technology, such as 
jet propulsion and electronics.107  Given the pace of technological change in the twenty-
first century, it seems unlikely that costs will come down any time soon.  Indeed, table 6 
shows that this trend has comfortably outlasted the Cold War: throughout the mid 2000s, 
for instance, F-22s were bought at $143 million each—to mention nothing of the 
enormous sunk costs associated with the Pentagon’s current F-35 program—while the 
United States’ first Ford-class carrier, scheduled to be completed later this year, has a 
mind-boggling price tag of $13 billion attached to it, compared with the roughly                 
. 
																																																								
106 Stanley and Pearton (1972), 101 
107 Ibid. 6 
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Air	Force	Fighters
P-47	(World	War	II)1 1.3
F-105	(1954-1963)1 20
F-15	Eagle	(1976)2 54
F-22	(2005)2 143
Strategic	Bombers
B-29	(World	War	II)2 8.1
B-52	(1955)2 87
B-1B	Lancer	(1986)2 317
B-2	Spirit	(1997)2 1,682
Aircraft	Carriers
Essex-class	(World	War	II)3 1,000
USS	Enterprise	(1961)1 3,577
Nimitz-class	(1975-2009)4 6,500
Ford-class	(In	production)4 12,887c
Attack	Submarines
Conventional	power	(World	War	II)1 63
Sturgeon-class	(1967-1975)5 580
Los-Angeles-class	(1972-1996)5 1,632
Virginia-class	(2004-present)4 2,700c	
Table	6:	The	Rising	Cost	of	Arms
Weapon	System	(Date	of																											
introduction	in	parantheses)
Estimated	Unit	Costsa																																				
(Millions	of	2015	US	$)b
Notes:														a
																										b Unless	otherwise	noted,	estimates	are	in	2015	US	dollars.
																										c FY2017	US	dollars.
Sources:											1:
. 																										2: United	States	Air	Force	Fact	Sheets
. 																										3:
. 																										4: Congressional	Research	Service	Reports
. 																										5: American	Federation	of	Scientists
Philip A. St. John, USS Essex CV/CVA/CVS-9, (Nashville: Turner Publishing
Company,	1999)	10
The	costs	of	these	major	weapons	systems	can	vary	substantially	over	time	as	
modifications are made to original designs or products are outfitted with
different technology. With regards to Nimitz-class carriers, for instance, the
USS Ronald Reagan was procured in FY1995 for $4.45 billion, while the USS
George H.W. Bush was procured in FY2007 at over $6 billion. As such, the
reader	is	asked	to	note	that	all	costs	listed	in	this	table	are	approximations.
Robert E. Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems, (Cambridge:
Ballinger	Publishing	Company,	1975)	47
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$1 billion required to construct its Essex-class World War II predecessor.  Ultimately, 
although the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about significant structural changes to 
the arms trade, some trends, like the rising cost of weapons, remained. 
 
THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: 1991 TO PRESENT 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 provided a definitive end to the 
Cold War.  As the world adjusted to the new political environment, so, too, did the 
international arms trade.  The volume of exports dropped precipitously from their Cold 
War highs, the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower, and, by and large, 
cost replaced ideology as the determining factor for arms deals in a manner sometimes 
reminiscent of the trade in the industrial era.  Additionally, today’s arms transfer system 
has been influenced by a variety of political and economic shocks: the Gulf War in 1991, 
multiple global economic crises, and the onset of the Global War on Terror.  This section 
will continue using SIPRI data to describe the evolution of the arms trade in the post-
Cold War era, focusing again on shifts in suppliers, the volume of exports, the structure 
of the arms industry, and the flow of arms transfers. 
First, the most conspicuous change to the arms transfer system in the wake of the 
Cold War was the collapse of the Soviet Union as the world’s preeminent supplier of 
arms.  More specifically, despite having inherited 71 percent of the Soviet Union’s 
defense industry, the Russian arms industry throughout the 1990s was “characterized by 
an extreme degree of over-capacity and a strong dependence on exports, both of which 
[were] primarily the result of the collapse of domestic arms procurement that began in 
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1992.”108  Indeed, by the end of 1993, 70 percent Russia’s defense manufacturers were 
idle, while still others sought to convert their productive capabilities from military to 
civilian goods.109  Of those still active throughout the 1990s, many were owed billions of 
roubles by the Ministry of Defence, which had failed to pay in full for the weapons it 
procured in that decade.110  Ultimately, although the decline in Russian arms production 
had ceased by 1998 as a result of strong government efforts to increase funding for the 
industry, consolidation amongst firms, and competitiveness in arms exports, Russia’s 
presence in the international arms trade for nearly a decade after the Cold War was 
nevertheless a fraction of its former self.111 
American arms manufacturers, also equipped to meet Cold War-level demand for 
arms, were consequently well positioned to take over the majority of the former Soviet 
Union’s market share, despite also suffering from a drop in global and domestic demand.  
Between 1992 and 2000, the United States enjoyed an unchallenged position as the top 
supplier in a largely unipolar arms transfer system, supplying half of all arms to global 
transfers.  This dominance in the arms trade in the wake of the Cold War is reflected 
below in figure 6, which shows the market shares of the major arms suppliers over the 
same period.  Putting numbers to the United States’ market share, of the nearly $124 
billion of arms exported from 1991 through 1995, the US was responsible for 
approximately $63 billion; from 1996 to 2000, American exports accounted for $60 
billion of the $125 billion total.  Moreover, at the firm level, of the 100 largest arms-
																																																								
108 Stohl and Grillot (2009), 26; Sköns and Weidacher (2002), 351 
109 Stohl and Grillot (2009), 26; Sköns and Weidacher (2002), 346 
110 Cooper (2001), 318; This debt was estimated at 32 billion roubles in early December of 2000. 
111 Sköns and Weidacher (2000), 323 
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producing companies in 1998, 39 were American.  They accounted for fully 56 percent of 
total arms sales among these top 100 companies.112 
 
 
 
 
On the following page, table 7 provides a more complete overview of how the 
supply side of the market has changed since 1991.  As discussed above, foremost among 
the shifts in suppliers is the fall of the Soviet Union/Russia from its position as the 
world’s leading arms exporter.  For instance, from 1991 through 2000, its market share 
hovered around 14 percent,113 less than half of the 35-40 percent it had cornered 
throughout the Cold War.  However, despite this drop in market share and the substantial 
																																																								
112 Sköns and Weidacher (2000), 302; SIPRI’s list of the top 100 arms-producing companies from 1989-
2001 does not include Chinese and Soviet/Russian firms due to data restrictions. 
113 This figure is slightly inflated from the value given in figure 6 due to the inclusion of the Soviet Union’s 
final arms exports in 1991, as noted in table 7.  The author has included these exports for the sake of 
consistency in the number of years in each period on the table.  
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1992-2000	
Source: SIPRI	Arms	Transfers	Database,	Accessed	05	March	2016
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problems riddling its arms industry at the time, Russia undoubtedly remained the second-
largest arms producer in the world, with a market share considerably higher than any 
other individual state’s share over the same period.  European firms, in contrast to 
Russian manufacturers, were robust and competitive, with thirty-eight companies on 
SIPRI’s Top 100 list in 1998 based in Western Europe.  These firms accounted for 36 
percent of total arms sales among the Top 100.114   The strength of Europe’s arms 
industry is further reflected in their exports: as shown in the table, collectively, the United 
																																																								
114 Sköns and Weidacher (2000), 302; By country, the breakdown is as follows: UK (13), France (11), 
Germany (6), Sweden (3), Italy (2), Switzerland (2), and Spain (1). 
Country 1991-95 1996-00 2001-05 2006-10 2011-15
United	States 50.9 48.1 30.1 29.5 32.8
Russia 13.8a 14.1 28.0 22.5 25.4
China 4.5 1.8 2.4 3.6 5.9
France 4.1 9.0 8.6 7.1 5.6
Germany 7.8 6.5 6.7 10.8 4.7
United	Kingdom 5.8 6.7 5.5 4.1 4.5
Spain 0.5 0.8 0.3 2.6 3.5
Italy 1.1 1.5 2.2 2.1 2.7
Ukraine 0.5 2.0 1.6 1.9 2.6
Netherlands 1.9 1.9 1.5 3.0 2.0
Israel 1.1 1.1 2.7 2.2 1.8
Sweden 0.6 1.2 2.4 1.8 1.5
Canada 0.7 0.4 1.1 1.0 1.0
Switzerland 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.0
South	Korea 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.7
All	Others 5.6 3.9 5.1 5.9 4.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note:
Source:
Table	7:	Post-Cold	War	Market	Shares,	by	State
								a					Figure	includes	Soviet	arms	exports	for	1991,	and	Russian	transfers	thereafter.
SIPRI	Arms	Transfers	Database,	Accessed	05	March	2016
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Kingdom, France, and Germany provided between 18 and 22 percent of arms to foreign 
buyers during the two periods in the 1990s. 
 The last major supplier in the 1990s was China, with arms exports composing 4.5 
percent of global transfers from 1991-95.  Although the country has in recent years 
become one of the biggest suppliers of the post-Cold War era, its market share dropped 
significantly in the mid 1990s and early 2000s.  As was the case during the Cold War, the 
Chinese defense industry in the 90s was producing considerably antiquated weaponry 
that was largely uncompetitive when brought to the international market.115  In 2000, for 
instance, a military commander in Pakistan, China’s biggest customer over the previous 
ten years, stated publicly that the latest Chinese combat aircraft would be useful only as a 
“stopgap.”116 
Nevertheless, in each five-year period since 1991, these top six arms producers—
the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and China—have 
consistently supplied the world with roughly four-fifths of its foreign-based defense 
equipment, providing a low of 78 percent in 2006 to 2010 and a high of 87 percent in the 
years immediately following the end of the Cold War.  Accompanying these producers 
are a host of smaller suppliers, the majority of which are located in Western Europe.  
Notably, of the fifteen biggest arms-exporting states listed in the table, twelve (excluding 
Russia, China, and Ukraine) have advanced, developed economies, a fact reflective of the 
wealth that has historically been required to achieve the economies of scale necessary to 
be competitive as an arms producer. 
																																																								
115 Hagelin et al (2001), 329-330 
116 Ibid. 330 
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Having already discussed Russia and China, Ukraine’s presence on the table, 
then, bears some explanation.  In short, as was the case for Russia, Ukraine inherited a 
substantial portion of the former Soviet Union’s defense industry: approximately one-
fifth of the Soviet Union’s total output and 15 percent of deliveries of end-product 
weapons were handled by Ukraine prior to its independence in 1991.117  Moreover, this 
was in addition to simply acquiring a sizeable portion of Soviet military equipment, much 
of which has since been sold abroad.118  Thus, since the end of the Cold War, Ukraine has 
had a significant defense industrial base from which to work. 
 Since the 1990s, market shares have shifted quite substantially.  As was 
mentioned earlier, already by 1998, in the aftermath of a financial crisis, the Russian 
arms industry had begun to rebound as a result of strong government initiatives to 
strengthen its defense industry.119  This change is reflected in Russian exports since the 
turn of the millennium, shown in table 7: during the period 2001-2005, Russia accounted 
for 28 percent of global transfers.  As of the latest five-year period, Russia remains the 
second largest producer of arms in the world and the source of a quarter of all 
internationally traded weapons.  Like China, the Russian arms industry has more recently 
suffered from both domestic and foreign concern over its poor quality controls and 
defective products, impeding Russian exports from rising further.120 
The market share of the other top-tier supplier of this era, the United States, 
declined drastically after the 1990s (when it was 50 percent), and has since 2001 centered 
around 30 percent, which was nevertheless sufficient to allow it to retain its position as 
																																																								
117 Cooper (1997), 259 
118 Anthony, Wezeman P., and Wezeman S. (1997), 275 
119 Cooper (2001), 317 
120 Holtom, Bromley, and Wezeman (2008), 299 
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the world’s largest arms exporter.  Much of this decline has to do with negative changes 
in demand from the Middle East and East Asia in the late 90s, a consequence of political 
and economic shocks that will be discussed below when we shift focus to the recipient 
side of the arms trade.  These regions were destination to a large portion of US exports 
and accounted for a huge percentage of global arms deliveries in the mid 1990s, with the 
Middle East and Asia at 25 and 48 percent, respectively, in 1996, for instance.121  
Moreover, US exports have also been suppressed more recently by growing negative 
public sentiment towards the arms trade: in the mid 2000s, “concerns were expressed in 
the US Congress about proposed arms sales and military aid to states in both Asia and the 
Middle East,” in addition to the imposition of arms export restrictions amounting to 
partial and blanket embargoes on some 25 countries by 2008.122  
Similarly, European producers in the past decade have faced a variety of political 
impediments, mostly at the transnational level, to the free transfer of weapons, though the 
final decision on whether to export remains largely at the discretion of the national 
governments.  As of April 2016, for example, 21 countries were subject to EU arms 
embargoes, while the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports has further disciplined 
member states’ arms transfers in the twenty-first century.123  Consequently, while the 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany maintained their combined share of roughly 20 
percent throughout the 2000s, as shown in table 7, they have in the last five years seen 
this figure drop to 15 percent.  Additionally, of the three, the UK’s arms sales since 1991 
																																																								
121 Anthony, Wezeman P., and Wezeman S. (1997), 274; These figures do not include the developed world 
as a ‘region.’ 
122 Holtom, Bromley, and Wezeman (2008), 296 
123 Ibid. 302; SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database (2016) 
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have been the lowest, in general constituting around three-quarters of French or German 
exports. 
Finally, China’s role as an arms supplier has increased since the late 90s.  
Between 2011 and 2015, it cornered 5.9 percent of the global arms market, more than any 
individual Western European state during the same interval, and enough to make it the 
third-largest arms exporter of this period.  Today, the volume of its foreign arms sales 
remains comparable with the big three Western European producers mentioned above.  
Again, as was the case in the latter years of the Cold War, the growth of Chinese exports 
can be explained in large part by the replication of advanced defense equipment 
purchased in limited quantities from abroad.  Indeed, in 2010, the “Russian Government, 
companies and media continued to voice concerns about China’s copying of its weapon 
systems,” particularly as this process increasingly places Russian arms in direct 
international competition with Chinese systems.124  Notably, between 2003 and 2007, 
China received 94 percent of its major conventional weapons from Russia.125 
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Ukraine, and Israel continue to serve as smaller 
suppliers of arms in the twenty-first century.  On the following page, figure 7 shows 
market shares by state for the latest five-year period in which data is available, and can be 
compared with figure 6 from earlier to highlight the shifts in market shares among the 
world’s principal arms suppliers. 
 
																																																								
124 Holtom et al (2011), 276-277 
125 Holtom, Bromley, and Wezeman (2008), 299-300 
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 In addition to shifts in suppliers, the volume of global arms transfers in the post-
Cold War era has been significantly lower relative to Cold War levels.  Referring back to 
figure 2 (page 35) from the previous section, arms exports declined rapidly after the early 
1980s, during which over $40 billion worth of defense equipment was sent abroad each 
year.  By 1994, exports had fallen to around $23 billion.  After a spike in sales in the mid 
to late 90s, international arms transfers bottomed out at less than $18 billion in 2002, the 
lowest single-year value for the arms trade in some 40 years.  Since then, however, 
exports have been climbing: in 2015, $28.6 billion of arms were sold to foreign 
customers. 
 By way of explaining these fluctuations, the political and economic events that 
have shaped the post-Cold War era are informative.  To start, the defense industry in the 
1990s experienced a profound decline in overall production as global military 
United	States	33%	
Russia	25%	
China	6%	France	6%	
Germany	5%	
United	Kingdom	4%	
Spain	3%	
Italy	3%	Ukraine	3%	
Netherlands	2%	 Israel	2%	 All	Others	8%	
Figure	7:	Post	Cold-War	Market	Shares,	by	Supplier	
2011-2015	
Source: SIPRI	Arms	Transfers	Database,	Accessed	05	March	2016
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expenditures and arms procurement plunged with the conclusion of Cold War tensions 
and the associated restructuring of the global security environment.  For the first half of 
the 90s, exports accompanied this decline, although to a lesser extent.  By the mid 1990s, 
however, “the USA and the main arms-producing countries in Western Europe increased 
their arms exports to compensate for the continuing decline or stagnation of domestic 
markets,” which broadly explains the aforementioned spike in transfers in the second half 
of the decade.126 
Additionally, the Gulf War in 1991 also contributed to this rise in exports: in 
response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the enormous arsenal Saddam Hussein had 
amassed during previous decades, many Middle Eastern states remained concerned over 
the possibility of invasion despite the conclusion of the conflict.  As a result, there was a 
widespread buildup of arms in the region throughout the 1990s, with the United States 
serving as the Middle East’s foremost supplier.127  When global arms sales began falling 
again after 1997, it was in part because many Middle Eastern states felt they had “made 
sufficient arms purchases during the Gulf crisis to meet their security needs for the 
foreseeable future,” and also in part because of economic crises in East Asia (1997) and 
South America (Argentina, 1999-2002).128  As mentioned above, demand in Asia, in 
particular, had been strong at this time; the financial crisis in 1997 therefore acutely 
impacted the exports of many arms manufacturers.  By 2002, with the onset of the Global 
War on Terror and the concomitant restructuring of the international security 
environment, the trend of declining exports reversed itself, with transfers since then 
steadily rising. 																																																								
126 Sköns and Baumann (2003), 374 
127 Stohl and Grillot (2009), 32-33 
128 Ibid. 25, 34 
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 However, the fact that both foreign and domestic demand for defense equipment 
was much lower in the 1990s relative to earlier decades had a substantial impact on the 
structure of the arms industry.  Arms manufacturers in the 90s needed to reconcile rapidly 
rising R&D and production costs (partially a result of the fourth trend from the previous 
section) with a shrinking export market, the latter of which has historically been the 
lifeblood of arms firms in the long run.129  In order to make use of the substantial 
economies of scale present in modern arms production, a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) swept across the industry in the 90s.  Although consolidation was the 
most popular strategy employed by companies at the time, it was paralleled by several 
other responses, including exiting the arms industry, diversifying into civilian production, 
‘internal company rationalization,’ and (often unsuccessful) efforts to increase exports.130   
This unprecedented restructuring of the industry is the third trend of the post-Cold War 
era that will be discussed.  To start, figure 8 on the next page shows the concentration 
ratios of the world’s largest defense firms using data from SIPRI’s Arms Industry 
Database.131 
As shown in the figure, in 1990 the five largest arms firms collectively produced 
just under one fifth of the Top 100’s total output in terms of the financial value of their 
arms sales.  By 2000, this figure had increased to over 40 percent, reflecting the arms 
industry’s movement towards a more oligopolistic market structure in the 90s.  
Consolidation continued through the early 2000s, ultimately peaking around the middle 
of  the  decade.    By  2005,  twenty  firms  produced  almost  three-quarters  of  the  arms  
																																																								
129 Sköns and Weidacher (2002), 326 
130 Perlo-Freeman and Sköns (2008), 265; See also Sköns and Weidacher (2000), 299-301. 
131 As noted in the figure, due to the lack of reliable information available, Chinese firms are not included 
in SIPRI’s database, and Russian ones only since 2002. 
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Elisabeth Sköns, Renaud Bellais, & SIPRI Arms Industry Network, Appendix	8A.	
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Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament
and	International	Security ,	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1997)	262-266
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Industry Data. In Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI	
Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, (New
York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002)	357-363
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C5 denotes the arms sales of the top 5 firms as a percentage of the total for the group of 100
in	that	year;	C10,	the	top	10;	and	C20,	the	top	20.
Chinese firms are not included in the SIPRI Top 100 “due to the lack of data on which to make
even a reasonable estimate of arms sales for most companies. Based on the overall industry
picture andon limited information on individual companies, it is nonetheless possible to state
that at least [9 of the 10 largest Chinese companies] would almost certainly be in the Top 100
if figures for arms sales were available” (Perlo-Freeman and Wezeman, pp. 211-212). For
similar reasons, Soviet/Russian firms are not included for 1990, 1995, and 2000, but are for
2005, 2010, and 2014. Data on Russian companies has been available since 2002. Thus, SIPRI
concludes that at least since 2002, “apart from the omission of China, analysis of the
companies in the Top 100 is sufficient to capture the major trends in global arms industry”
(see	Perlo-Freeman	and	Wezeman,	pp.	206	for	more	information).
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manufactured by the SIPRI Top 100—the companies of which collectively “account for 
the majority of the global financial value of sales of military goods and services.”132 
American manufacturers were at the forefront of this M&A activity.  Indeed, 
according to one finding in a 2002 US Department of Defense report, “what were 51 
separate US defense business units in 1980” became 4 “large defense-focused firms” by 
2001.133  The rapid consolidation amongst American firms alone explains a large portion 
of the increase in concentration in the industry.  As we have seen above, the list of the 
100 largest companies has been, and is to this day, dominated by American firms: in 
2008, for instance, 41 companies on the list were based in the United States, and 
accounted for 63 percent of the Top 100’s arms sales.134 
 However, as shown in the figure, after the mid 2000s, this trend reversed itself, 
and the arms industry has since been moving towards greater competition.  September 
11th helped bring about not only an increase in foreign demand for arms (making exports 
more viable), but also an increase in domestic demand, particularly in the United States 
as it became involved in Iraq and Afghanistan.135  With military expenditures rising 
steadily and government defense contracts flowing to arms manufacturers once again, the 
pressure to consolidate on many defense companies was greatly relieved.  On top of this, 
increases in domestic procurement provided governments with an incentive to intervene 
in the arms industry in order to maintain competition among producers.  Since the late 
1990s, for instance, the US Department of Defense has moved to oppose several mergers 
and acquisitions, invoking anti-trust concerns: the acquisition of United Defense by 
																																																								
132 Perlo-Freman and Wezeman (2014), 206 
133 Department of Defense (2002), 2 
134 Perlo-Freeman and Sköns (2008), 256 
135 Ibid. 266 
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General Dynamics in 1997; the merger of Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin in 
1998 (which, today, are both among the five largest arms companies in the world); and 
the proposed acquisition of Newport News Shipbuilding by both General Dynamics and, 
later, Litton Industries, all serve as cases in point.136 
 Finally, shifting focus now to the demand for arms in the post-Cold War era, two 
trends are of note.  First, referring back to figure 3 (page 38) from the previous section, it 
is evident that after a decline in demand among developing nations in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War, the ‘third world’ has, since the mid 2000s, once again become 
the destination of choice for arms exports.  After procuring a low of $58 billion worth of 
defense equipment from abroad in the period 2000-2004, imports by the developing 
world increased by more than 75%, reaching $102 billion in the latest five-year period, 
2010-2014.  By contrast, developed countries, which together imported a post-Cold War 
high of roughly $59 billion in the second half of the 90s, have most recently (in 2010-
2014) procured just $37 billion from abroad. 
Of course, since figure 3 does not include domestic procurement, it would be 
incorrect to conclude that the developing world is becoming rapidly more armed than the 
developed world.  As we have previously established, developed economies, as home to 
the majority of the world’s arms-production capacity, are able to acquire the majority of 
their defense equipment from domestic industries.  Nevertheless, it is still striking that the 
developed world procured fewer arms from abroad in 2010-2014, a time of generally 
increasing arms production, than in any other successive five-year period since data was 
first collected in 1950.  In other words, recently, arms seem to be traded less amongst the 
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producing nations themselves, and increasingly with developing states.  The implications 
of this will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
Period Rank State Imports	($	Billions) Percent	Total
1 Taiwan	(ROC) 16.275 7.4
2 Turkey 16.206 7.3
3 Saudi	Arabia 14.549 6.6
4 South	Korea 12.446 5.6
5 Japan 11.844 5.4
6 China 10.423 4.7
7 India 9.914 4.5
8 Egypt 9.829 4.5
9 Greece 9.618 4.4
10 Israel 6.181 2.8
All	Others 103.526 46.9
Total 220.811 100.0
1 China 23.907 10.6
2 India 20.059 8.9
3 South	Korea 11.05 4.9
4 Greece 10.074 4.5
5 UAE 9.331 4.2
6 Pakistan 7.898 3.5
7 Australia 7.76 3.5
8 United	States 7.148 3.2
9 Turkey 6.312 2.8
10 Egypt 6.135 2.7
All	Others 114.946 51.2
Total 224.62 100.0
1 India 20.107 14.1
2 Saudi	Arabia 9.932 7.0
3 China 6.681 4.7
4 UAE 6.553 4.6
5 Australia 5.204 3.6
6 Turkey 4.927 3.4
7 Pakistan 4.722 3.3
8 Viet	Nam 4.115 2.9
9 United	States 4.108 2.9
10 South	Korea 3.761 2.6
All	Others 72.780 50.9
Total 142.890 100.0
Source:
Table	8:	Top	10	Post-Cold	War	Arms	Importers,	by	State
1992-2000
2001-2010
2011-2015
SIPRI	Arms	Transfers	Database,	Accessed	05	March	2016
Note: Since the Soviet Union still exported a significant amount of arms in the year of its dissolution, the year
thereafter—1992—was selected as the starting point for the table to ensure that the last of the Soviet Union's
transfers	did	not	influence	importer	rankings	for	the	post-Cold	War	era.
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The second development in demand is the shift in recipients of arms within the 
developing world.  On the previous page, table 8 lists the world’s biggest post-Cold War 
importers to date, providing a sense of the international flow of transfers since 1992.   
Notably, in every period, Asian and Middle Eastern countries have dominated the list.  In 
the 1990s, for instance, the only country outside of these regions was Greece, which, 
since 2001, has been joined only by the United States and Australia.137  The rise of Asia, 
in particular, as a consumer of defense equipment is evident in table 8.  Since 2001, India 
and China have purchased nearly one fifth of all arms sold on the international market.  
Indeed, the rise of India as an importer is also particularly striking: fueled by a long-term 
and ongoing border conflict with Pakistan, India imported more arms in the five years 
since 2011 than it had in the entire decade prior, claiming 14.1 percent of global imports 
from 2011-2015.  The incessant tension between India and Pakistan has contributed to the 
presence of both countries among the top 15 importers in the world for several decades 
now.138  Lastly, owing in part to recurrent conflicts in addition to oil wealth, demand for 
arms in the Middle East has remained strong, with Saudi Arabia emerging in 2011-2015 
as the world’s second largest weapons importer.  Its current conflict with Yemen, 
discussed at the beginning of the paper, has made Saudi Arabia a lucrative market for 
Western arms in recent years.  The UAE, Egypt, and Turkey have all also been prominent 
Middle Eastern importers in the post-Cold War era, as the table shows. 
 On the following page, figures 9 and 10 show imports by region in the 1990s and 
in the most recent five-year period.  Comparison of the two figures reflects the trends 
suggested by previous table 8:  namely, the growth of Asia and the continuing importance  																																																								
137 That is, assuming Australia is considered part of the developed world as opposed to Asia & Oceania. 
138 Hagelin et al (2002), 380-382 
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of the Middle East as a destination for exports.  For instance, while Asia & Oceania 
purchased approximately 18 percent of arms sold abroad in the 1990s, demand in the 
region has since then nearly doubled, with 34 percent of arms transfers in the last five 
years flowing to Asia.  The Middle East, similarly, has consistently served as the 
destination for around a quarter of the world’s arms transfers, as shown in figures 9 and 
10.  Ultimately, as was the case during the Cold War, as the volume of exports increased 
in the 2000s, the flow of arms has tended towards the developing world.  Indeed, in the 
last five years, 75 percent of arms transfers have gone to developing countries, compared 
to 53 percent in the 90s. 
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS	
 
The arms trade may be ugly, but it is inescapable. Nations want to defend themselves and will buy weapons 
to do so. Rather than trying to abolish the trade, it makes more sense to improve it, make it open, 
transparent and efficient.139 
-Joe Roeber, “Hard-Wired for Corruption” 
 
 The export of arms deserves special attention over the trade in other goods 
because of the impact such transfers have on both human life and human welfare more 
generally.  In identifying the drivers of change in the arms trade and the defense industry 
throughout history, this thesis contributes an explanation for the prevalence and often 
unrestrained nature of these exports. 
The first half of the paper described the emergence of the private firm as the 
dominant mode of arms production, in addition to the proclivity of these manufacturers to 
tap into foreign markets in order to secure a steady, long-term source of revenue.  The 
second half of the paper, which examined the trade since World War II, made it clear that 
arms production is once again increasingly in the hands of a few powerful private 
companies.  Moreover, as the cost of arms continues to soar, the importance of exports as 
a means for these firms to cover rising production costs is unlikely to diminish in the 
foreseeable future.  The US government’s latest weapons program, for instance, is also 
the most expensive in history: RDT&E (research, development, test & evaluation) for the 
F-35 program contracted to Lockheed Martin was valued at over $55 billion in 2015, 
with total program costs exceeding $1.5 trillion.140  It should come as little surprise to the 
reader, then, that “unlike the F-22A Raptor, the F-35 was designed for export from the 																																																								
139 Roeber (2005) 
140 Department of Defense (2015), 2 
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onset,” nor should the irony of Lockheed Martin’s company slogan be lost on the reader: 
“We never forget who we’re working for.”141 
 As was discussed in the previous section, the extent to which arms are exported 
carries with it substantial implications for the developing world, which, since at least the 
middle of the twentieth century, has been the destination for the majority of international 
weapons transfers.  The debt incurred by developing countries as a result of such arms 
purchases, as well as the pervasive corruption concomitant with the trade, both serve as 
avoidable but significant barriers to the economic and social wellbeing of these states, 
which spend millions on gratuitous defense equipment instead of allocating these scarce 
resources to fund more development-essential programs such as infrastructure, education, 
and healthcare. 
With this in mind, enhancing efforts to rein in the global arms trade and 
controlling, in particular, the ability of private manufacturers to peddle death around the 
world—with government complicity—seems to be the next logical policy step, even if 
this has historically met stiff resistance from all players involved in the trade.  While 
producing countries are uninterested in losing access to lucrative foreign markets and, 
consequently, curbing their capacity for defense production by abstaining from the 
economies of scale present in the arms industry, importing countries cry foul as they lose 
the ability to purchase the means to defend themselves.  Nevertheless, from a global 
perspective, greater transparency and more stringent application of export controls, 
licensing agreements, and end-user certificates would represent first steps towards a more 
prosperous and less violent world. 
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Appendix A: A Note On Data 
 
There are two primary sources of data on the arms trade: the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIRPI) and the US government’s annual World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) report, originally published by the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).  Since 1999, this has been published by 
various agencies within the State Department (most recently the Bureau of Arms Control, 
Verification and Compliance, or AVC), which absorbed ACDA at the turn of the century.  
Because the WMEAT reports go back only to the early 60s, include small arms, and were 
discontinued for some years in the early 2000s, the figures and tables in this paper from 
the Cold War section forward all use SIPRI data in order for values to be comparable and 
consistent across time.  The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database contains data as far back as 
1950 and includes only major conventional weapons, the primary focus of this paper.  
 
Additionally, the reader must be aware that SIPRI does not document the financial values 
of arms deals, but rather attempts to more broadly capture the sales price of the actual 
weapons being traded.  Owing to things such as offsets or outright corruption, the total 
costs of arms deals are often more than just the price of the arms.  To this end, the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute uses a unique system to put a price to 
the cost of arms transfers known as Trend-Indicator Values (TIV).  “Based on the known 
unit production costs of a core set of weapons,” SIPRI TIV are consistent over time, with 
any changes being applied retroactively.  The purpose of this unit is to ensure that data 
measuring the flow of arms is comparable across both time and regions.  To illustrate 
how SIPRI TIV would value a delivery of arms, the following example is provided from 
SIPRI’s website: 
 
In 2009, Germany delivered 6 Eurofighter combat aircraft to Austria. One Eurofighter is valued at 
55 million SIPRI TIV. Therefore the delivery is valued at 330 million SIPRI TIV. 
 
More information on how SIPRI TIV are constructed and the source of this explanation 
of it can be found here: 
 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2016). Explanation of the TIV Tables. 
Retrieved March 05, 2016, from SIPRI Website: 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background/explanations2_default 
 
Information on and online copies of WMEAT reports can be found here: 
 
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. (2015). World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers. Retrieved March 23, 2016, from US State Department 
Website: http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/ 
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Appendix B: Regional Divisions 
 
The regions below follow SIPRI’s divisions found at Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute. (2016). Regional coverage. Retrieved March 05, 2016, from SIPRI: 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/regional_coverage 
 
 
Developed World (IMF Advanced Economies)* 
In all figures and tables involving the developed world as a ‘region’, the following countries 
were removed from their respective geographic regions and included only in this category. 
(1950–): 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, West 
Germany (FRG), Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States. 
 
(1990–)**: 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Korea. 
 
*The IMF’s 2015 list of advanced economies can be found at International Monetary 
Fund. (2015). World Economic Outlook: Adjusting to Lower Commodity Prices. 
Washington (October). 148 
**Due to the mutability of developed/developing status, as well as the fall of the Soviet 
Union, several countries were added only after the Cold War period.  Additionally, since 
the precise year in which a state may be considered “developed” can be contentious, this 
paper makes only two broad divisions.  Nevertheless, the reader can be assured that the 
trends discussed and illustrated by figures in the main text are still present when using 
alternatives to the IMF’s list. 
 
 
Africa 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Asia & Oceania 
Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, 
Indonesia, Hong Kong, Japan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, South Korea, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor Leste, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam. 
 
Europe 
Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia (–1992), Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, East Germany (GDR)      
(–1990), Germany (FRG), Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
FYROM), Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine, USSR/Russia, Yugoslavia (former, –1991). 
 
Middle East 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, North Yemen (–1990), South 
Yemen (–1990), Yemen. 
 
North America 
 Canada, United States. 
 
South & Central America 
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 
Venezuela. 
